Abstract: This paper first summarizes two central debat es in the field of social sd ent ific Internet research, namely the deba t e ab out the so-called 'socia l impact of Int ernet use' and the debate about the existence of community on the Int ernet. Ear ly res ea rch discussed w hether building up a community on the Internet w as possible a nd what the effects of t he use of the Internet w ere for its user. Recent research on t he social consequences of Internet u se s uggests tha t ' the' Internet should n o longer b e regarded as a const ant that has uniform effects for its users. Rather, the consequences of it s use depend on a numb er of contextua l conditions . T h e pap er presents some t heories t hat explain w hich condit ions and fea tures of online groups facilitate the fin d ing of solutions to bilat eral or group-level problems of cooperation.
Introduction
T his pa p er a rgues t h a t t he current schola rly d ebate a bout t h e social consequ en ces of Internet use suffe rs from a lack of theor y gu ided em pirical r esearch. It aims at sh ow ing tha t t h eory guided research on t he Int ernet and its con sequ en ces can lead t o n ew insights tha t are useful fo r the research d eba t e a nd tha t h ave importa nt p olicy implications . The p ast a nd curr ent d ebate a bout t h e effec ts of Int ernet use is ch aracter ized by a lack of t heories that wou ld b e useful for informing emp irical r esearch w ith clear policy r elevan ce. Nevert heless su ch t heories em erge although t h ey a re not yet wid ely recognized . A summ a ry of a number of su ch theories of online inter action is giv en, as a starting point for furt he r theoretical d evelopm ent a n d as a n inp ut for empirical research.
T he paper is b uilt up in t he following wa y. Section 2 summa r izes t h e recent deba t e a b out the social conseque nces of Internet use. As we will see, resu lt s of t h ese studies su ggest t ha t it is n ot useful to talk of 'the' consequences of 't he' Internet. The con seq ue nces of Internet use are diver se for its users. At the same tim e, these consequ ences a r e, a t least to a limited ex tent, pr ed icta ble, since t h ey d ep end strongly on t he social context of its use. M oreover , empirical r esu lts suggest tha t r esear ch on onlin e groups is useful for gaining m ore insight as to wh ich a t t rib ut es of t h e social context a r e importa n t for desira b le or un desirable con sequen ces of Inte rnet use. Section 3 presents som e emp irical studies t h at sh ow h ow online groups are often used. It gives an overview regarding the debate whether online groups can have the character of a community. Different con ceptions of the term "online community" are presented and their distinctions are m ade clear and Contrasted to the traditional use of the term "community" within sociology. The distinctions suggest that it is fruitful to d iscuss t he question under which conditions online groups can reach some of the qualities that t raditional communities have. Section 4 presents a number of theories t hat p oint to some of these conditions. These theories analyze different problems of interaction in online groups and how these a re related to properties of t he group. The crucial point is that the theories support the argument that the consequences of t h e use of the Internet depend on some group properties. Moreover, t he emergence or decline of many of the group prop erties can be influenced by t he way in which online groups are built up or maintained. Therefore t he theories n ot on ly have strong implications for future research, but also for the sh aping of t h e Int ernet or the governance of online groups. However, this potential can only be fulfilled if empirical research on the use of the Internet takes these diverse theories into account and if theoretical research develops these theor etical a pproaches further or complements them w ith additional ideas in a way that h as an eye on future em p irical research. The last section gives a sum mary and pr oposes su ch directions for future r esearch.
Past Issue I: The D ebate About the Social Consequences of Internet Use
One of the most cent ral questions in the public d ebate abou t the In ternet is w h at its consequen ces for societ y are (see e.g. Katz/ Rice 2002; Putnam 2000) . Kra ut et al. (1998) a n alyzed the effects of the use of t h e Internet on a number of indicators for social integration and psych ological well-being. They fou nd sm all, but sta tistically significa nt negative effects of t he intensity of Inte rnet use, as measured by a utomatically logged data, on the amount of self-reported family communication, t he size of the local social circle and t h e distant social circle. Additionally, they reported small, but statistically significant positive effects of the intensity of Internet use on the inten sity of feelings of lon eliness, stress, and d epression. The study results wer e fier cely discussed and oft en criticized. For example, critics argued that t he items used for measuring t h e size of t h e social circles had a bias, favoring face-to-face contact s and n eglecting online contacts (Hampt on 2001) . Subsequently publish ed studies eit h er sh owed t hat Internet use was positively related to social integration and community involveme nt (e.g., Cole 2000; Rainie/ Kohut 2000), or n egatively (see e.g. Nie 2001 ), or t h at t h ere was n o evidence for a supposed n egative effect of In ternet use on differ ent measures of social integration (Katz/Rice 2002) . However, t h ese studies did n ot have t wo imp orta nt stre ngths that the original study had, n amely t h e use of a panel d esign a nd a utomatically logged data on Internet use. The strongest counter evidence against the gener alizability of the original findings came from t h e authors of the study themselves. In a st udy that analyzed whether the original effects could be replicated with the same and wit h another sample, the authors did no longer find any evidence for the effects as found in the first study, with the exception of a positive effect of Internet use on stress . In this second study, the authors found evidence for the hypothesis that Internet use leads to an increasing gap in the nu mber of contacts between those who have already ma ny contacts and t hose wh o have n ot. Especially extroverted people and people with many contacts wou ld pr ofit from Internet use by making more contacts.
Since then a number of studies appeared that showed differential effects of the use of the Internet on social integration for different users (see e.g. Katz/ Rice 2002; McKenna 2002; McKenna/Bargh 1998; Cummings/ Sproull/Kiesler 2002;  and the studies mentioned in Katz/ Rice 2002) . Tyler (2002) therefore argues that it is no longer reasonable to speak of a 'main effect' of t he In ter net. Rather, the consequences of Internet use would depend on the goals of t h e users and the social context of their use of the Internet. Kraut et al. (2002) suggest that the differences in t heir findings a r e rela ted to changes of the Internet in the second half of the 1990s. T he first st udy used data collected in [1995] [1996] while the data of the secon d study were collected 1998-1999. The authors a r gue tha t in the 'early' times of t h e Inte rnet, user s mostly used it as a tool for informa tion r etrieval. In the second half of t h e 1990s users have more opportunities to socialize online with their friend s and colleagues since mor e of them are online themselves. Moreover, t h e 'later' In ternet itself offers a lot of opportunities tha t a r e explicitly design ed for socializing or t h at have the potential to lead to n ew contacts. These ch anges m ight ex p lain why t h e two studies led to different findings.
Especially the use of online groups has the potential to lead to n ew contact s a nd to increase community involvement of Internet users. M oreover, t h e use of online groups is n ot uncommon among Internetusers (see section 3) . Therefore the a n alysis of h ow structures of online groups influence the ou tcom es of t h eir use is of crucial importance for finding out m ore a b ou t t h e social con sequences of Interne t use. In a similar way DiMaggio et al. (2001) argu e t hat the analy sis of institutional conditions of Internet use and the dist inct ion b etween d ifferent kinds of online communities would inform r esearch a bout the social implications of the Interne t.
The outcom es of online groups for their me mbers depend much on t h e solution of problems of cooperation. For example, a self-help group on t h e Internet will b e more useful for its m embers, a nd for societ y, if mem bers give mut ual social support and a re motivated t o contribute to public goods, such as building up informative web-sites or fostering lively group discussion. Discussion in online groups for r esear ch er s or for employees in or ganizations a re m ore satisfying for the m embers, m ay lead t o a higher degree of group attachment , a nd increase econ omic efficien cy m ore if the m ember s are motivated t o contrib ute to t h e gr oup discussion. The p erforma n ce of tasks by groups of vir t ual organizations, economic transaction s in online b usiness groups, a n d the op port unities for making contact s, and t hus the provision of social capital for its m embers, depend to a large extent on a sufficiently large motivation of members to contribute to online discussions.
Traditional communities are known to have structures that facilitate the solution to problems of cooperation (see e.g. Bowles/Gintis 1998) . Therefore finding out more about which conditions foster the development of typical 'community qualities' in online groups or finding out which group conditions help solving problems of cooperation contributes to answering the question what the social consequences of Internet use are.
Past Issue II: The Debate About the Existence of Communities on the Internet
The term "community" has ma ny different meanings in sociology (see Mat zat / De Vos 2000; Hillery 1964 ). Some a rgue that a group should be called a community if members have direct, multiplex, and durable relations t h at are governed by reciprocity and if the members are strongly interdependent on each oth er (Taylor 1982) . Othe r researchers stress that community cannot be based on inter est s alone, but that social bonds based on emotions (Durkheim 1964) or feelings of group attachment (Weber 1922 ) are crucial for a group tobe called a com mu nit y. Additionally, characteristics such as a high degree of perceived h omogeneity among me mbers (Gusfield 1975) , common beliefs, norms, and v alues (Durkh eim 1964) are by some regarded as t y pical. Ther e is no consensus ab out wh ich of the cha r acteristics are necessary qualities t hat make a group a community. Wha t researchers do agree about, istha t membe rs of traditional communities are geographically close t o one another (Hillery 1964) , which facilitates that many of the 't ypical' characteristics of communities are en sured. However , in on line groups the geogra phical d istan ce b etween its m embers ca n be huge. Ther efore, in the second half of the 1990s a discussion about 'community qualities of online groups' e mer ged. Just as ther e are a variety of definitions of the concept of "community" , t here are many different ways in which the term "online community" is used in the public a nd academic discussion (Wellma n/ Gulia 1999) . Moreover, som e a uthors prefer expressions like ''virtual community". I mention two typ ical p oints of V leW.
Rheingold (1993) defines a n online community as a group of p eop le who discuss a topic in a computer mediated way for a sufficiently long time with a sufficient emotional involvem ent and who form inter personal r elationships . Hagel/ Armstrang (1997) use t h e expression online commun ity for any computer mediated space tha t allows communica tion b etween its users or m embers and t h at is cha racterized by som e member-generated conte nt . T he different m eanings of t he con cep t of online community h ave a striking similarity to the sociological community discussion, as rela t ed to the presen ce of common interests a nd em otions. One group of r esearchers defines an online community in su ch a way that all kinds of online groups a re included. The relevant elem ent of t his group of definition s is t h e interperson al communication on a common top ic, which imp lies only a common interest-e.g., Hagel/ Armstrong (1997) . The second group of researchers additionally stresses the emotional elements t hat online communit ies can have---e.g., Rheingold (1993) .
The discussion whether online groups are 'real' communities is characterized by a diversity of opinions as well. Especially the potential of online communities to have some emotional qualities was discussed. Rheingold (1993) argues that whenever computer-mediated communication technologies are available to people anywhere, they will build communities with it. He is of the opinion t h at online communities present new forms of an old phenomenon, namely of living in a community with all its specific emotional qualities. At t h e sam e time, a number of scholars criticize this assessment. Wilbur (1997) argues t hat online communities do not have (emotional) qualities of a community because t h ey are based only on special interests. Foster (1997) misses com municat ion about the group identity ('we-information') and Stoll (1995) regards communication in online communities as too narrowly specialized for having comm un ity qualities. Weinrich (1 997) takes a slightly different position by stating t hat only local communities can establish online communities with real community qualities. Global online communities cannot exist as a community because according to him trust, cooperation and friendship a re based on cont acts in t h e real sensual world.
So the choice of the definition of the term online comm un ity h as to take into account the difference between groups that are based only on interests a nd groups that include emotional qualities. It would b e advantageaus if su ch a definition does not exclude examples that a re discussed in the prominent literatme of online communities. Moreover, it sh ould b e broad en ough so that t h e question of whether online communities have community qualities is n ot a p riori decided by this definition, but by e mpirical research. H ere, the t erm online community is used to describe a group of usersofaweb site, who int eract with each through computer mediated communication tools of this site. Interaction is centered on a t least one topic that reflects the common interest(s) of the site use rs.
This definition describes a n online community as on e tha t is based on interests alone, but n ot on em otion s or othe r characteristics. If an online community h as additional ch aract eristics, such as feelings of group attachm ent, emotional b onds to other m embers, or common values and norms, it will b e called a "social online community". Otherwise the t erm "online community" is used inter ch angeable with the t erm "online group" .
The use of online communities is not a ma rginal phenomen on on the Int ernet. Horrigan (2001) reports that 4 7% of responde nts of a random sample of US Internet users in the year 2001 said they joined an online community (or an online group in the terminology used h ere). In Italy, 13% of r espondents of a ra n dom sample of Internet users in t h e yea r 2002 said t hey would p articipate in a n online community (Ma ndelli/ Bossi 2003).
Online groups often su cceed in fulfilling t h e common interests of their m emb er s (Matzat 2001 ; Cothrel/ Williams 1999; King 1994; C um mings/ Sp roull/ Kiesler 2002; McKenna/Bargh 1998; Constant/ Sproull/ Kiesler 1996) . Som e online groups h ave, at least in the v iew of their members or of observers, import a nt characteristics of a social online community (see e.g . Baym 1993; Hafner 1997; Basta ni 2000; Dunharn et al. 1998 ). On the other h a nd, empirical research also shows that many online groups even fail to reach minim um significa nt member activity (Cummings/ Butler/ Kraut 2002) , so tha t it m akes no se nse t o t alk a b out qualities of a social online community.
These find ings emphasize that, a t the c urrent sta t e of t he art, it is only of limited use to discuss a ny lon ger whether social communities exist on the Internet. The answer to this question is simply "yes". Un clear is h ow oft en we can find online groups or social online communities whose use leads t o sign ificant benefits for the members and on what conditions it depen ds whe ther problems of cooperation a re solved a nd characteristics of a social com mu nity evolve. It m ight be that the social online communities that were presented in t he literatme are just exceptional cases (Cummings/ Butler/ Kraut 2002) . The p resent ed findings underline that it is useful to a nalyze on wh a t conditions it depen ds whet her an online group solves problems of coope ra tion a nd whether it d evelops t o a social online community.
The ories of Inte raction in Online Groups and Community Developme nt
There exists n o system atic theory of online communit y d evelop men t. T h ere a re more or less ela b or a ted theories a b out conditions t h at affect p rob lems of coop eration or that affect t h e developme nt of diffe ren t characteristics of so cial online communities, such as group attachme nt , the creat ion of em otion al bond s, or complia nce to norms. It re mains t o b e seen whether t hese t h eories, if t h ey find empirical eviden ce, could b e b u ilding blocks for a theor y of social on line community development. Mor eover , problems of coop er at ion and pr oblems of t h e emergence of social online communities are prob ably related. Existing r esear ch su ggest s that the d evelopm ent of (social) com munity character istics r educes problem s of coop er a tion (see e.g . Bowles/ Gin tis 1998) . O n the other h a n d, p rob le ms of coop eration a re u biquitous . W hile t heir solution is definitely n ot a sufficient condition for the em ergen ce of a social online com mu nity, I wou ld a rgue tha t it facilitates t h e development of a social onlin e community. Emotion al involvem ent is u nlikely as long as m embers behave uncooperat ively. In t h e following, a number of t h eories a r e selected t hat have been used to a n alyze online interaction.
1
The first part p resents theories tha t a pply a hu m an-comp u ter interaction p erspective. Th at is, t h ey a nalyze how technology set s u p constraints and p ossib ilities for online inter ac tion. In the second part, sociological t h eor ies are d iscussed t h at foc us on group structures, followed by p art t h ree t h a t t akes a more social-psych ological p erspective. Jones/Rafaeli (2000) examine how different communication media can be used to structure online discussions in groups in such a way that typical problems are less likely. They regard information overload of the members as a typical problern for online discussions, together with the free-riding problem. They argue that the problern of information overload affects the stability ofthe group. Ifthe communication volume is too high, some members willleave (ibid: 218f). The free-riding can occur since in discussions in online groups every member profits from the discussion independently of his/her own contribution, the discussion is a public good for the group. The authors argue that for overcoming the public good problern a sufficiently large 'critical mass' of members is important. At the same time, the higher the number of members, the more likely the problern of information overload would be (ibid.).
In addition, the authors make use of the concept of "interactivity". 'Interactivity' is the extent to which a sequence of messages relate to each other, and especially the extent to which later messages recount the relatedness of earlier messages (Rafaeli/Sudweeks 1997) . This leads to the following relationship between the number ofmembers and the two problems of online groups, as clarified in figure 1. There are two crucial thresholds in the figure. According to the authors, until the first threshold (point 1 in figure 1 ) is reached, an increase in membership size would be strongly and positively related to the volume of sustained communication. After that, an increase in membership size would still be positively, but less strongly related to the volume. If membership size reaches the second threshold (point 2 in figure 1 ) the addition of even more members would no Ionger result in an increasing effect on the volume of sustained communication, because of cognitive boundaries of the members to process the overload of information. The authors argue that too high a volume of communication beyond the members' cognitive boundaries would-at least in the long run-result in a decreasing membership size (Jones/ Rafaeli 2000, 220) . If t he zone 2 of information overload is reached, some members leave the group, so t h at after some time the volume of communication will reduce and t he volume of sustained communication is not inc reased.
The authors analyze the effects of the type of communication media t hat is used (synchronous versus asynchronaus communication), the t ype of communication ( empathetic versus other communication), and t he degree of interac tiv ity on the group size at which the problern of information overload (point 2 in figure  1 ) sets in. Their most interesting arguments are summarized in t he follow ing two hypotheses (see Jones/ Rafaeli 2000, 219f for the d etails).
Their first hypothesis is as follows: Asynchronaus communicati on m edia t h a t allow information storing, such as emailing lists, could reach a lar ger mem ber population before the problern of information overload sets in t han syn chr onaus communication media, such as an Internet Relay Channel. T hey also argu e t hat for empathetic discussion tobe sustained it requires a gr eater d egree of interactivity than for a discussion about a specific topic. The degree of interactivity, in turn, would be positively correlated with the information-processing load. As a consequence, they present a second hy p othesis: When equivalent com puter media ted communication tools a r e used, an online group t h at condu cts empathetic communication h as a smaller 'maximum sustainable act ive m embersh ip size' than an online group that discusses sp ecific topics su ch as softw are su pport. With a "sust ainable active m embership size" the auth ors m ean a number of members who actively contribute to the online discussion bu t wh o do not p ost a too high number of messages so tha t the cognitive bounda r ies of t h e m ember s arenot exceeded. No m ember would then leave because of a too h igh number of messages. As a result, the number of active m embers could be sustained. If t h is maximum sustainable m ember ship size is exceeded some members would leave.
The arguments of J on es/R afaeli (2000) p oint to imp ortant conditions t h at could influen ce the st a bility of m embership in online grou ps. Empirical r esear ch suggest s that a rising membership size of online groups indeed has a p ositive effect on the communication volume. A high er communication volum e increases the turnover r a te (Butler 2002) . However, to my knowledge ther e exist s no comp a rative empirical r esear ch tha t has tested t he m ore sp ecific hypoth eses of the a uthor s.
A drawback of their a rguments is t hat they do n ot specify how t he free rider problern in online groups is solved. The argument s su ggest that as long as the group is large e nough, the problern will som eh ow b e solved. H owever, em pirical research shows t h at this is n ot always true (see e.g. Cummingsj B utler/ Kraut 2002). A la rge gr oup size alon e does not guara ntee a sufficient number of contribution s as lon g as the members h ave no sp ecific r eason to become act ive. Here the t heory r emains completely silent about wh a t that r eason m igh t b e. M or eover , the theor y also does not say a ny thing about a m ember 's decision wheth er to st ay or to leave t h e group , apart from t ha t it would d epen d on t he information overload. It seems unlikely that all factors that influence t he exit d ecision are mediated by its impact on the information overload. For examp le, if m embers have a strong interest in the maintenance of relationships with other members, they may decide to stay although they suffer from a too high v olume of communication. It seems that theory about the goals of the m embers and h ow t h ey influence their behavior is needed here.
Usabilit y and Sociability in Online Groups: Media and the Development of Empathetic B ehavior
Preece (2000; 2001) is also strongly concerned about t he appr opr iaten ess of d ifferent communication media. She is interested in the development of emp a thetic behavior in online groups. Preece (2000) argues that for t h e d ev elopm ent of empathy between members of online groups it is important tha t t he y reach a "common ground", that is a "mutual beliefthat they sha re a common u nderst and ing" (ibid: 157). Her idea is that the emergence of empathy is a coordination p rob lern between interacting individuals (see especially ibid: 156f). T he coordin ation of the communication process and its content during the interact ion sh ould facilita t e the emer gence of empathetic rela tions. Preece (2000) exten ds arguments of Cla rk/ Brennan (1993) to make predictions a b out how diffe rent m ed ia influ en ce the development of empathy in online groups. For instan ce, email communica tion w ould have the disadva ntage that emotional understanding suffers from poor social presence of the communicating individuals . O nline grou ps t h at rely on bulletin b oard messages could support socio-em otion al com mu nication better b eca use of the possible use of icons. Gra phical a nd t extual Multi User Dun geons w ould also h ave the advantage t ha t there a re well-developed ways of displaying em otions (Preece 2000) . He nce, during email communication t he pr oblern of coordination should b e stronger tha n during communication t h a t relies on a bulletin b oard or a Multi User Dungeon. Preece (2000) does n ot argue t h at email communication makes the d evelopment of a common grou n d, a nd t h er eby of empathy, impossible. Ra ther , the drawb acks tha t som e m ed ia according to h er h ave, would h ave to b e compe nsated by additional active communication efforts of members t o develop empathe tic rela tions . Preece/ G hozati (2001 ) , in a conte nt a n alysis of m essages in 100 public bulletin boards a nd newsgroups, found tha t e mpathetic m essages wer e quite common. Commu nication in online support groups h ad a larger prop or tion of empathic m essages t han communication in cultural, professional, sports or oth er online groups. M oreov er, online groups with a highe r proportion of women h ad a high er prop ortion of e mpathetic messages. Ut z (2000) sh owed t hat the use of icons is positively associa t ed with the likelihood to m ake n ew fr iendship r elation s in Multi User Dungeons a nd tha t t h e use of em oticons is rega r ded as useful for the display of e motions (U t z 2001), as Preece (2000) p resu pp oses. H owever, ther e is n o compa rative e mpirical research tha t allows assessing to what ex te nt the use of differe nt media had disadvantages for the d evelopment of emp athy. Ethnographie studies and a n ecd otal evidence su ggest t h at in e mail group communication , which accord ing t o the theory sh ould h ave disadvantages for t h e development of empathy, empathetic communication is not uncommon (Bastani 2000; Avery 1998) .
The question whether different media have an important impact on the development of empathy is not yet decided. Survey studies t hat systematically compare online groups that use different media are rare. A related drawback of existing studies that rely only on content analysis is t hat t hey do not have direct measures of how much empathy the members of online gr oups perceive. It would be useful to supplement such field studies with corresponding survey data. Moreover, while different media may impose specific constraints for individual action, the focus on technology alone does n ot answer the question wh y and h ow empathy develops in some groups, but not in others. For example, is the development of empathy always only a problern of coordina t ion ? If members of an online social support group may have not only common interests but also some conflicting interests with regard to empathetic communication, then there exists a problern of cooperation which is more difficult to solve. Some memb ers in support groups may have an interest in 'telling their story' and getting em pathy from others, but not in listening and giving feedback, that is, in givin g empa thy themselves. If two such me mbers interact, t hen there is a not only a problern of coordination-that could perhaps be solved by the p rovision of additional informat ion about the emotional make up of the members-but also a problern of cooperation. There is indeed evidence that online grou ps face problem s of cooperation for the provision of social support (Markey 2000) . Which group structures help t o overcome this p roblem? Finally, in social support groups there ofte n is a n eed for collective effort s, such as providing information ab out solutions for medical, psychological, or social problems to a data base. To answer the question w hich group structures facilit a te the provision of public goods on e needs behavioral theories.
Group Structures and Behavior in Online Groups
The followin g three groups of authors examine h ow different properties of online groups affect the b eh avior and the goals of m embers of online groups and t h er eby lead to specific outcomes.
A Theory of R eciprocity in Knowledge Sharing Groups
Thorn/Connolly (1987) a nalyze the contribution behavior of users of a common data base w ho can d ecide whether to contribute to the data base by giving away some piece of inform a tion. If the user contributes, he must b ear som e costs. In addition, h e obtains some benefits from every piece of information t hat is contributed by other users to the data base. In the simplest case the theory assumes that the costs are equ al for all users and for every piece of information. Under these condition s, every user is better off by withholding his inform ation, which is a 'domina nt strategy' in game theoretical terms, because for every user there a r e costs but no benefits of his own contribution. To t h e extent that these simple assumption s reflect real a rrangements of data bases, t here will b e a tendency for every user to free ride on the contributions of ot her users, as Thorn/Connolly (1987) argue.
Nevertheless, according to the theory, a user can be motivated to contribute if he hopes that his contribution will induce other users t o recipr ocate a nd contribute as well. The authors base their reasoning on t h e emp irical findings of experiments with iterated prisoner's dilemma games. In a t wo-person case the second user immediately knows whether the first user helped or harmed him, and he is able to reciprocate. Cooperation can be used as a reward, and d efection can be used as a punishment for the other actor's past behavior. Experimental research in small groups has shown high rates of contribution being motivated by reciprocity considerations. Thorn/ Connolly (1987) claim t h at in a similar way users of a data base are motivated by a hope for r ecipr ocity. They wou ld use their information contribution toreward the contribution of oth er users and to be rewarded in the future.
In the following step, the authors relate the hope for reciprocity to a n um ber of group conditions. They argue that the larger the group of actor s, the less easy it is to track down contribution or withholding of ot her users and to p unish or reward accordingly. If a user rewards a small minority of con tributors in a large group , then a t the sam e time the large majority of fr ee r iders a r e also reward ed. Therefore, since rewarding a ppropria tely does n ot work so well in larger groups, a larger group size will, according to the a uthors, redu ce t he h ope for r eciprocity a nd thereby the d egree of r eciprocal cooperation. Therefore, t h ey expect tha t a Zarger group size of data base users willlower the contribution rate (Connolly/Thorn 1990).
Based on the assumption that the hop e for r eciprocity is an incent ive to contribute, the authors argue tha t la rger contribution costs or a lower value of the information benefit will reduce the contribution r ate. Mor eover, t h ey investigate the effects of heterogeneity of users. Three kinds of heterogeneit ies a re distinguish ed: he terogen eity of the average b en efit of infor mation provided by different users (heterogeneity of information quality), heterogeneity of the b en efit tha t users obtain from the sam e piece of infor mation (heterogeneity of interests), a nd heterogeneity o f the contribution costs. Their theory predicts tha t the introduction of any of the three kinds of h eterogen eity w ill lower the contribution rate, because they reduce t he hope for reciprocity. For example, assume that a group of user starts as a completely h om ogenaus group. After some time a subgroup of users acquir es-for whatever reason-highe r q uality information. Now ther e a r e some users wit h 'h igh quality info rmation' and oth ers w ith 'low quality inform ation', so t h at t h ere is a higher d egree of he terogen eity of information quality in the whole grou p. The exch anges of contribution s among t he first subgroup of users is according to Thorn/Connolly (1987) governed by t h e h op e for reciprocity. However, a user w h o contributes high quality informa tion does not receive much of value in r eturn from users of the second subgroup. The theory claims t hat his h ope for recipr ocity a nd thus his incentive t o contribute a r e then reduced. The user's reduced contribution rate, in turn, will also reduce the h ope for r eciprocit y of the other users (Thorn/Connolly 1987). A similar line of reasoning is used for the two other predictions (ibid., 224). This effect of heterogeneity is seen as a peculiarity of a collective good that consists of information. Ev eryone pr ofits from a contribution except the contributor him-or herself.
The theory of Thorn a nd Connolly (1987) has interesting implications. Before I present some empirical evidence, I first mention two points of cr iticism. The first one is related to empirical applications of the group size hypothesis; the second one concerns the general theoretical foundation.
The original hypothesis about the negative effect of gr oup size on t h e willingness to contribute information was developed for the explanation of the contr ibution behavior to a data base of an organization. In such a situation users are informed about the approximate size of the user group. This may be d ifferent fo r members of online groups on the Internet who contribute to online discussions. They may have no knowledge at all about the size of t he grou p. T he point is that according to the arguments of Thorn/ Connolly (1987) a user's hop e fo r reciprocity can be reduced by a larger group size only if he realizes t hat m any other passive users do exist. Others argue t hat the grou p size hypothesis is valid for online groups in gen eral (see below). However, in this case one either h as to assume t hat members of online groups h ave at least a vague idea about grou p size, or on e has to a r gue that the group size hypothesis d oes not necessarily imply that the m ember s are aware of the group size. According t o such a point of v iew, the rewarding or punishing of other membe rs by giv ing or wit h holding information may h ave objective effect s that d epend on the group size, but n ot on w hethe r the information provider (or withholder) is aware of this size. It is unclear to m e wh ether a ny such 'justifications' for applying t h e grou p size hy pothesis are r easonable for d efending its application in t h e con text of on lin e groups. In any case, other researchers did apply the ideas to online groups (see b elow) .
A second p oint of criticism con cerns the solution offered to t h e collective good proble m , w hich is , from my point of v iew, not completely satisfying. According to the r eciprocity model use rs initially h ave a h ope for reciprocity. They give information to reward t h e past b ehavior of othe r users, and t h ey w ithhold information to punish other users who h ave not contributed in t h e past. H owever , rewardin g other members through cont ributing useful information facilitates the production of the collective good n ot only directly, but also indirectly by its r ewarding function if we follow the logic of this argumen t . T hus every group me mber p rofits from rewarding active members. However, the provision of these reward s also costs time a nd effort. W hy should memb ers n ot save their time a nd let others b ear the costs? They w ill gain the benefits of t he r ewar ds, i.e. the future active p a rticipation of the rewarded members, nevertheless. Even if a me mber thinks tha t reciprocal cooperation w ill induce other mem bers to cooperate in the future, this does not imply t ha t he feels as ob ligation to personally reward the past coopera t or. Othe rs could also do the r ewardin g . The original free-rider p roblern of contrib uting is r eplaced by a second-order free-rider proble rn (Colem a n 1990, 270) of r ewarding t h e past b ehav ior of active m embers. Therefore, the original question "why do members contribute?" still remains unanswered at a higher level. Even if we take the assumption of a hope for reciprocity for granted, the theory does not provide a theor etically satisfying answer to the collective good problem, if it does not explain w hy this second-order free-rider problern can be solved more easily than the original free-rider p rob lem.
If we analyze discussions in online groups on the Internet, a n d not t he pr ovision of information to a data base within an organization, the ch a r acter of the problern changes somewhat. Discussions in online groups t hat consist of public answers and questions partly have the character of a public good, since everyone profits of them independently of his/ her contribution. At t h e same time, if members have particular individual interests in the answers to t he q uestions they stated themselves, and if they have a h ope for reciprocity, then t he mechanisms specified by Thorn/Connolly (1987) could work. Un de r t hese conditions bilateral cooperation might arise and the free rider problern would t hen be solved as a by-product.
Thorn/ Connolly (1987) tested some of their hypotheses experimen tally and found significant negative effects of the heterogeneity of informa tion quality and of information inter ests, but a n on-significa nt effect of group size (com paring groups of four users with groups of eight users). Rafaeli/LaRose (1993) made use of some ideas of the theory to explain the usage of public electron ic bulletin boards that a re accessible via t elephon e a nd modern. However, t hey did n ot analyze indiv idual contribution rates. Rat he r, their d ependent variable is the ra tio of the number of files sent within a week t o a bulletin board ('number of contributions') to the total number of weekly file tra nsactions. The total number included the number of contributed as well as the number of d ownloaded files by users. They found only a n egligibly small negative effect of group size on this 'contribution level'. 4 Hoffmeiste r (2000) tested some ideas of t h e recipr ocity model to explain differences in the indiv idual contribution rates of approximately 900 users of 52 non-acadernie emailing lists. His dependent variable is t h e selfrep orted participation b eh avior of the respondents. He sh owed tha t t he high er the user subjectively p e rceived the probability of receiv ing an answer t o a question, the high er the likelihood tha t his self-reported n um ber of sent m essages was la r ger than the mean self-reported number of sent messages fo r all users. This association was significant w hile controlling for knowled ge of the user and for the subjective assessment of how great t he past information benefits have been. In addition, in a mu ltivariate a nalysis the self-reported exp ected size of the information benefit was not significantly associa ted with t h e self-reported participation behavior. Besides the questionable validity of the used indicators, the study of H offmeister (2000) h as one notable limitation. Its sample is biased in favor of those emailing list members who are active participant s. A total of 90% of the respondents were active p articipa nts in t h eir mailing list. How-ever, other research has shown that active participants constit u te only a small minority of all members, the proportion being approximately 10% in academic mailing lists (Stegbauer/ Rausch 2001 ) . Therefore, it is a n op en question whet h er the non-significant effect of the ( expected) information benefit is due to the homogeneity of the sample and whether the found effect can be generalized to a population consisting of both active and passive members . Matzat (2001) , in a study of 49 academic emailing lists, tested some of the hyp ot heses by a n alyzing the public answering behavior of researchers. The dependent va riable of t his analysis is constructed from publicly archived d ata about the communication of the members, and not from self-reported data, while the information for the independent variables consists of survey data. The study found marginal ev idence for an effect of the information benefits and costs, but no effect of t he group size or of any other of the hypothesized effects of group properties.
The discussion shows that under certain conditions a hope for recipr ocity may work in online groups. Moreresearch is needed t o find ou t which conditions induce such a hope. Kollock (1999 ; is inter ested in the question why a considerable number of online groups do not fail to produce public good s althou gh grou ps on t h e Internet prov ide opportunities for anonym ous and short-term inter action. He firs t examines the restrictions a nd opportunities tha t online environm ents impose on me mbers of online groups. Second, h e prop oses a number of poten tial motivations that could lead them to contribute to the production of public good s. Based on these proposals , h e su ggest s some features of on line grou ps t hat cou ld induce members to coopera t e with other m embe rs . W hile Kollock (1999; does n ot aim to present a coher ent theor y, his analyses nevertheless lead to inte resting hy potheses.
The Economies of Online Cooperation
According to Kollock (1999) the r estrictions and op port unities for the pr oduction of public good s in online gr oups d iffer in three important ways from the conditions in groups tha t exist offiine. These a re changes in t h e costs of production, the b e nefits, a nd in the production function, t h a t is in the way in w hich the p rop ortion of contributor s to a public good rela t es to t he d egree of production of this good.
The costs for a n indiv idual to contribu te to a public good in a n online group w ould b e compa r atively low , since they consist mainly of the time and the effort (a nd for some the p rov ider cost s) one need s for sending online m essages, su ch as em ail. M oreover , coordination costs for gr oups would drastically b e r educed b ecause meetings w ith other p eople a r e easily organized. W hen offiine grou ps go online, t he benefits would change as well. The consu mp tion of digit alized information by on e m ember does not r educe the a m ou nt available to others, so tha t ma ny public goods in online groups would b e purely indiv isible. Since in the weste rn world the Interne t is basically accessible to ever ybod y, an almost unlimited number of indiv iduals would profit from digit alized info rm ation. A rem a rka ble ch aracteristic of the production function would b e that in on lin e groups one single member can often produce a public good. Consequently, fo r the production of these goods there are no coordination costs, which means that for the members the fear to waste resources for n othing is eliminated. The effects that these changes in the constraints and opportunities for the pr oduction of public goods and for the emergence of cooperation have, then depen d on the prevailing motivations that individuals have for behaving cooper atively. Kollock (1999) distinguishes the following possible motivations.
As one possible motivation to cooperate he mentions anticipated r ecip rocity. Kollock (1999) emphasizes that this motivation sometimes occurs in a system of generalized exchange, that is a system of exchange in which a ben efi t given to a member is not reciprocated by the recipient, but by another group member. Another potential motivation to cooperate would be the gain of r eputation in the group. The provision of high quality information or the w illingness to help others in the public domain may increase one's prestige in the grou p. As a third possible motivation Kollock (1999) mentions a sense of efficacy. Providing informat ion or help to others often results in a sense that one has a p ositive imp act on the environment. These three kinds of motivation rest on self-interested b ehavior. A m otivation tha t does not rest on the assumption of purely self-interested behavior could b e that cooperative b e havior is induced by t h e need of others. Kollock (1999) a rgues that a high degree of a me mber 's group a ttachmen t or h is commitment to the group would m ean that the well-b eing of the group or oth er group m embers strongly affects his own interests.
Depending on what motivations prevail in online groups, K ollock (1999) claims tha t certain features of online groups encourage cooperat ion. If t he first two motivations prevail, anticipated reciprocity and reputation gains, t h en online groups with a large 'shadow of the future' (a la rge proba bility of fut ure in teraction), a nd a large and p ositive 'shadow of the past ' (knowled ge about pr evious coop erative behavior by others) should induce a high degree of cooperation. Conseque ntly, Kollock (1999) regards a high likelihood of future interaction of the same members, identity p e rsisten ce, knowledge of previous inte raction of m emb er s, visibility of membe rs' contributions, and well defined gr oup boundaries as group features tha t support cooperative b eh avior.
If a sense of efficacy rules b eh avior of ma ny m embers t h en , according to Kollock (1999) , it may b e that as group size increases these mem bers are stronger motivated to cooperate. If altruistic motivations prevail for m embers, such as a high degree of group a ttachment, then these m embers would b e m ore m otivated, the more d eveloped , clear er articula ted and communica t ed the goals of the group are.
The analysis of K ollock (1999; 1998) is on e of the very few t h at systema tically takes into account how features of online groups provide incentives for behaving coop er atively. Many of its strengths h ave not yet been used for empirical Internet research. (See for example K ollock 1998 for predictions r egarding wh at kinds of online fa ntasy communities are successful.) Evidence h as been found t hat for research ers in academic e mailing lists the opportunity to gain r eputation in the acad emic community is a strong incentive to b ecome active in online discussions (Matzat 2001) . Other studies that provide evidence for anticipated reciprocity have been discussed in the previous section.
The validity of the hypothesis about anticipated reciprocity as a d riving force behind cooperation also has been discussed in the previous section. What Kollock (1999) adds isthat he puts anticipated reciprocity in t he vicinity of a system of generalized reciprocity. The weakness of this point is t hat Kollock (1999) regards anticipated reciprocity as a form of self-interested b ehav ior. Under conditions that he hirnself mentions, such as ensured future interaction, self-interested behavior may lead to bilateral reciprocity. A system of generalized r eciprocity, however, strongly has a character of a public good. It is unclea r how one can explain the emergence of a system of generalized reciprocity with the assumption of (bilateral) anticipated reciprocity.
There are promising directions for useful supplements of Kollock's (1999) arguments. First, what might be added to the list of motivat ions t hat induce cooperative behavior is the goal to make new contacts. In many groups a member probably feels less embarrassed if someone whom he knows by nam e (or has heard of already during previous public discussions) approaches h im. Thus, the contribution to online discussion s could be used strategically for facilitating t h e making of new contacts. Newly made contacts ca n b e of a p rofessional or private nature and could thus be of gen eral r elevance for the con tributing beh avior of me mbers in different kinds of online groups. S econd, based on assum pt ions of specific motiva tions, one could in more d etail derive predictions about sp ecific structu res of online groups tha t support coop eration and t h e p rovision of public goods. For example, Matzat (2001) shows that academic emailing lists t hat have a highly integrated community of research ers as a part of t h eir m ember sh ip stimulate active discussion contributions stronger tha n lists t hat have a less integrated community as part of the membe rship. This wou ld b e due to t he fact that in such online groups m ore r eputation can be gained than in other online groups. Third, it would b e useful to find out how bilateral r eciprocity is rela ted to generalized reciprocity. Fourth, one could elaborate t h e h ypot h eses about motivating goals tha t stimulate coop er a tion. At the mom ent, hypotheses about self-interested b eh avior are completely unrelated to hypot heses a bout b ehavior that is m otivat ed by t h e goals of other members or of the wh ole group. It may b e that different t ypes of personality h ave their differ ent motivations. However , it would b e of considerable t h eoretical a nd practical interest t o find ou t, wheth er a nd under wh at condition s self-inter ested behavior or behav ior that takes into account the goals of the group prevails and how the two broad t ypes of b ehavior relate to each other. K ollock (1 999) hirnself argues that comp letely altruistic b eh avior would seldom occur.
A Theory of Relational Signals in Online Groups: the Stimulation of Member Participation
The starting p oint for the t h eory is t hat me mbers of online groups have individual inte rests and common group interests tha t would motivate t h em to con t ribute to online d iscussions (Matzat/ De Vos 2000) . The two kinds of interest eith er can be in complete accordance, or fulfillment of the one kind of interest can be disadvantageaus for the fulfillment of the other . In the latter case indiv iduals or ie nt their action either more to the one or to the other goal. The goal t hat attracts the member's attention and structures the decision situa tion in su ch a way that other competing goals vanish in the background is called the 'situational frame' (see Lindenberg 1997; 1998 for the details). In online groups frames for m embers can be more oriented towards fulfilling the member's indiv idual interests, for example in online markets, or more towards fulfilling the com mon group interests. An example of the latter would be a self-help group that emphasizes the needs of all group members. Another point of the theory is that the member's b ehavior in the online group sends so-called relational signals to others. Three kinds of signals are distinguished. First, in bilateral interaction a member's behavior gives information about how he evaluates the bilateral relationship t o t h e ot her m emb er. His behavior could indicate an interest in the relationship itself, or it could indicate that he regards it only as a means for the short-term fulfillment of his own goals. Second, a member's participation in the activities of t h e group, as well as his non-participation, gives information to t he whole group h ow h e r egards t h e common group goals. The extent of his contribution to a comm on goal or the ext ent to which h e is willing to provide information to other mem bers indicates whether the d ecision frame of the m ember is in accordance wit h t h e frame of the group. As a third point, especially the administrator of an online group sign als through his own behavior what kinds of behavioral standards h e exp ects from the m embers. For example, a group administrator wh o a ppeals to t he m embe rs' fairness signals tha t in the online group members sh ould evaluate the onlin e inte raction not only on the b asis of maximization of one's own int erests. The importance of rela tional signals for the members' b eh avior can differ b etween online groups, depending on certain conditions, as is d escr ibed below.
A distinction is made between three differ ent kinds of tools that the administration of the online group has for infl.uencing the members' behavior. The first kind of tools, so called frame -stabilizing tools, work by incr easing the salience of the common gr oup goal. They enhance the individual's attention to t he frame, thereby bringing it more in t he foreground a nd diminish in g the relevan ce of the maybe confl.icting particular interests of the individual. T his m echanism reduces the value of t h e m ember's background goals and t hereby also reduces t h e m ember's costs that may result from n eglecting them. Fra me stabilizing t ools are those t ools tha t make the group easy to identify, tha t m ake mem bership easily recognizable a nd thereby stress t he salience of the common group goal. Examples a r e the use of symbols within the group or the d evelopment of rules t hat govern t he joint efforts t o r each the comm on goal.
The second kind of management tools is called indirect control tools. T hese make use of the form al or informal rules that exist in a group. Su ch ru les Coordinate the joint achiev ement of t he common goal (see b elow the example of the 'WELL'). Indirect control tools work through relation al signals t hat indica te t h e individual's interest in conformity to the rules and thereby indirectly also his conformity to the group frame. Indirect cont rol t ools are those t ools that provide opportunities and incentives for the members to send relational signals that indicate accordance with the group frame. They have t he effect that individuals may restriet the fulfillment of the individual short-term goals because they take into account the relational signal of their behavior (and thus the grou p frame). If the frame is not too individualistic, the individual h as an incentive to signal to others and to the group his compliance with t he frame to avoid informal sanctions. Group administrators can use these insights strategically by making use of minor group crises that give the members an opportunity for relational signaling. For example, the online community m anager of t h e famous WELL used the difficulties the community had with deviating m embers for a public discussion about the group frame and its related rules of conduct. It was decided that no direct sanctions should be applied to deviating m embers if the deviation was not extremely severe. At the same t ime, t he management indicated that informal sanctions applied by the members wou ld be adequate (Hafner 1997) . This gave the members low cost opportunities to sign al t h eir willingness to comply with the group norms and the frame by applying informal social sanctions to the offender.
The third kind of management tools, direct control tools, work t hrough enhancing the direct benefits for a group me mber, as opposed t o t hr ough influencing the perceived benefits like the frame sta bilizing tools do. Examples for direct monitoring tools in the realm of online communities are t h e in t r oduct ion of direct rewards for active participation in the online commu n ity. For exam ple, Shafer (2000) proposes to give discount ra tes for some p rodu cts to members who are extraordinarily active in discussions of commercial onlin e communities.
Under which conditions is w hat kind of tool more successful for t h e stimulation of active participation of the m embers? The impact of a d ir ect m onitoring tool is restricted in situations of a large r elevan ce of r elational in ter ests, t hat is, in situation s in which members have a strong interest in t he m aintenance of good relations to othe r members. The three kinds of tools constitute a h ierarchy of tools tha t progressively indicat e a lack of relational interests (Lindenberg 1998) .
Direct control tools imply the signal tha t the memb er is expected not to take into account the inte rests of othe rs for his behavior. They signal to t h e members that the group or in this case the online com munity administr ator expects the me mber not to have any rela tional interest. A ccordingly, t h e larger the importance of relational interests in the group, t h e less adequate direct control tools are likely to b e. On the other hand, the larger t h e importance of relation al inter ests, the more adequ ate are tools tha t indicat e more r elational interest. Consequently, t h e larger the importance of relational interests in the group, the mor e adequate a r e frame-stabilizing a nd indir ect m onitor ing tools.
Fin ally, the t h eory claims that two importa nt gr oup pr operties influence the d egree of relational interests and thereby influence the effect of the t h ree k inds of m onitoring tools. First, some online communities serve a specific goal of narrowly sp ecialized interest groups, while others fulfill many differ ent purp oses for its m embers . This is called multifunctionality of an online comm un ity, where multifunctionality is highe r as t h e online community fulfills for its m ember s mor e differe nt kinds of goals. Second, online groups are d istinguished according to their degree of sacial embeddedness. The more the online interaction of the members is embedded in interactions outside of the online group, the higher the degree of social embeddedness of the group. The theory argues that un der a condition of a high degree of embeddedness or multifunctionality the interdependencies between group members are stronger. The higher t h e interdependencies between actors, the more they will develop relational interests, given that there is not too much competition between the members. For ex ample, if an actor depends on another actor for the fulfillment of many of his goals, he will d evelop an interest in maintaining a good relation with him.
Accordingly, the theory also predicts that in online groups with a high er degree of embeddedness or a high er degree of multifunctionality, fra me st abilizing or indirect monitaring t ools would be m ore successful in t h e stimulation of active membership participation than in groups with a low degree of embeddedness or mul tifunctionali ty.
A strength of the theory is that it offers a more coherent fram ewor k for predicting under what conditions group members behave narrow ly self-interested and under what conditions they take into account the interests of others or the common group inter ests. The theory is currently being tested in an on going research project about a number of knowledge sharing online gr oups.
Group Attachment and Norm Compliance in Online Groups
Sassenber g (2002) takes up a general distinction b etween grou ps a nd a p plies it to the Internet. He distinguishes between so-called 'common bond' and 'comm on identity' groups. The crite rion for this distinction is the kind of attachmen t t hat the members have to the group. If the members' att achment to t h e gr oup is based prima rily on the bonds b et ween indiv idual members, then t h e group is called a camman band graup. If the membe rs' attachme nt to the grou p d epen ds m ost of all on the identification with the group as a whole, that is on t he identification w ith its common goals and purposes, a nd is indep endent of the attractiven ess of indiv idual members, then the group is called a camman identity graup. Sin ce the reason for m ember ship in common ide ntity groups d ep ends less on the d rapout of other m embers , common ide ntity groups a r e expect ed to have a mor e st able membership t han common bonds group. M oreover , stron g identification wit h the group is expected to fost er participation in collective action. Therefore members in common identity groups should p a rticipate more in collective action tha n m embers of common bond groups.
While the existen ce of common bond a nd common identity grou ps h as b een found in studies n ot r elated to t he Internet, Sassenberg (2002) a r gues t h at a simila r distinction can b e made for d ifferent t yp es of ch a t grou ps. C h a t gr oups could be divided into gr oups that were established to discuss a special topic, so called an-tapic chat channels, and groups t h at are intended as a m eans t o fos t er the making of contacts b etween individuals, so-called aff-tapic chat channels. Sassenber g (2002) claims tha t on-topic cha nnels correspond t o common identit y groups a nd off-t opic chann els to common bond groups. As a consequence, h e exp ects the following. Me mbers of on-topic chat ch annels (1) sh ou ld show a stronger social identification with the channel as a whole, and (2) should perceive a lower attraction of the individual channel members (both as compared to members of off-topic channels). In addition, (3) the degree of social identification of members of on-topic chat channels should be more strongly related to the attraction of the whole group than to the attraction to the indiv idual members, and (4) in off-topic channels the social identification with the group sh ould be more strongly related to the perceived attraction of the individual m emb er s tha n to the attraction of the whole group.
Moreover, Sassenberg (2002) claims that a stronger social identification with a group should lead to a stronger compliance to its norms. Accordingly, he a rgues that members of on-topic chat channels would behave m ore in accordance to the norms of their group than members of off-topic channels. The d ifference in norm compliance should be mediated by differences in t he d egr ee of so cial identification with the group as a whole: members of on-top ic cha t chann els a re expected to show a stronger norm compliance because t heir social identificat ion with the group as whole is stronger than for members of off-topic chat chann els.
Sassenberg (2002) tested these hypotheses with a comb ina tion of survey and logged d a ta ab out the online behavior of memb ers of off-topic and on-topic ch at cha nnels . Ninety four participants of G erma n on-top ic and off-topic ch annels w ere surveyed. D ep ending on their ch a t-ch a nnel the p a rticipa nts wer e cat egorized by two coders as member of a n on-topic or off-top ic chat channel. In the study, corroborating evidence for the expected differen ces in t h e degree of social identification with the gr oup as a whole a nd the p e rceived attraction of indiv idual m embers was found. Moreover , as predicted, for members of off-t opic cha nnels social identification was n ot r ela ted t o group att ract ion , but p ositively rela t ed to p ersonal attraction. For m embers of on-topic channels so cial iden tification was p ositively r ela ted to group attraction and even n egatively rela ted to p er sonal attraction.
For a naly zing norm complia nce Sassenberg (2002) proposed t o measure the h om ogeneity of the use of synonymous smileys a nd acronym s b y m ember s of a cha t ch a nnel. The mor e homogen eous the ch a tte rs use t h e same acr onym s and smileys the stronger would b e the adher en ce to the grou p n orm of t h e chat cha nnel. H e indeed found the exp ected differ en ce in h om ogeneity. Chat ter s of on-topic channels used much more homogen eous acronym s a nd smileys than chat ter s of off-topic cha nnels. This effect of the t y p e of t h e online gr oup disa pp eared when the d egree of social identification was in clu ded as an add itional varia ble in the a n alysis (w hich media ted the rela tionsh ip b etween t h e typ e of group a n d n orm complia n ce). Sassenberg (2002) r egards t h e findin gs as sup portive for the assumption tha t the differ en ce b e tween common iden tity and comm on b ound gr oups is meaningful on the Internet as well. S ocial identification with the gr oup would b e a n imp or tan t fact or of b ehavioral influen ce in ch at groups a nd promising for the distinction b et ween differ ent t y p es of ch a t grou ps.
According t o my p oint of v iew this distinction could b e promisin g esp ecially since it m ay b e rela ted t o a numbe r of other ph enomen a, su ch as group sta b ility, me mbers' involvement in collective action, a nd n orm com plia n ce t hat have a direc t or indirect relevan ce for the developme nt of q ualities of a social on line community. However, a t the moment, there is only evidence for a n effect on nor m compliance, but n ot on membership stability or collective ac tion, as Sassenb erg (2002) hirnself a rgues. Again, m ore empirical research would b e needed here.
I would like to add some suggestions. It would be interesting t o kn ow w het h er the distinction between common b ond a nd common identity grou ps is mea ningful only for chat groups or w hether it can b e ex tended t o other kinds of on lin e groups. Does it make sense to distinguish b etween differe nt kinds of b u llet in boa rds, Multi User Dungeons, newsgroups, or emailing lists on t h e b asis of the kind of attachment tha t group membe rs have? A second p oint of discussion is the kind of norms tha t the study a naly zes. In the chosen exa mp le, t h e hom ogeneous use of acronyms and smileys in a group, the n orm is a convent ion and every m ember of a common identity gr oup profits from its com p lia n ce since it ma kes communication more efficie nt. Colema n (1990) calls t his kind of n orm s "conjoint convention al norms" . The problern of realizing and m aintaining a conjoint conve ntional norm consists of solving a problern of coor dination. The group members have to find a consensus a b out the kinds of acronym s t hat sh ou ld b e used and every m ember has t o get the informa tion a bou t this consensus. In ma n y common ident ity gr oups t his is a matter of time. The use of acronym s by me mbers can b e seen as a trial a nd error p rocess tha t in som e groups w ill converge, for example if ma ny memb er s use initially t h e sa me or similar acr onym s. Once the consensus is r eached, it w ill b e self-maintaining in a com mon iden tity grou p.
An im p orta n t p oint to n ote is t h at other kind s of norms a r e less easily r ealized a nd maintained. In k nowled ge sh a ring groups mem bers wit h only a little knowledge m ay exp ect from me mbers w it h mu ch knowledge t hat t h ey give awa y som e of their knowledge (see e.g . McLure Wasko/ Fara j 2000) . In su ch ex amp les the ta rgets a nd the b en eficia ries of the norm consist of distinct grou ps, wh ich complicates the a rgument . M oreover , w it hin t he kn owledge sharing grou p one can expect to find conflicting interests about h ow much kn owled ge sh ould b e given away. T h e proble rn of reaching a consen sus a b out t h e nor m w it h in the group does n ot only consist of a pr oblern of coordination. It is a prob lern of COoperation that imposes costly contrib utions of the members . Such kind of n orms a re called "disjoint essential n orms" (Coleman 1990) . M any k nowledge shar ing a nd self-help online groups face problem s tha t could b e solved by r ealizing and maint aining disj oint essent ial n orms. It would b e of much mor e in ter est t o find out wh ether common id entity online gr oups a re more su ccessful t han comm on b on d online grou ps in esta blishing disjoint essential norms .
A final point is t he ex pla n a tion for t h e fou nd d ifferences in com p lia n ce to the conjoint conventional norm. I would like to offe r an alt erna tive explanat ion t h at does not r ely on processes of social ide ntification.
5 Rath er it focuses on structural differ ences b etween comm on b on d a nd common id ent ity chat gr oups. B y d efinition, members of common b ond grou ps a r e st ronger att ract ed to oth er co-members t h an m emb ers of common id entity groups a r e a t tract ed to t h eir co-membe rs. It is mor e likely tha t memb ers of common bon d ch a t grou ps concentra t e t h eir cha t communication only on t hose few members to whom t h ey are strongly attracted, and tend to avoid chat communication wit h oth ers to whom they are less attracted. On the other hand, members of comm on identity chat groups have a common interest, and will therefore t end to have mor e chat communication of general interest to all members. As a consequence, in common bond chat groups the communication structure is much m ore fragmented into different cliques that do not chat with each other. This stronger fragm entation of communication in common bond chat groups im ped es t he d iffusion of information about used acronyms from one clique to another. The result is t h at in common bond groups a larger heterogeneity of used acronyms can be found. According to this alternative explanation the difference in n orm compliance, as this is called by Sassenberg (2002) , depends on differences in the commu n ication structure, and not on cognitive processes, as Sassenberg (2002) assumes.
Summary and General Discussion: Directions and Open Questions for Future Research
This paper argues that theory guided research is of importance for t he discussion about the so-called social consequences of Internet use. The findings of empirical studies suggest that the impact of the use of the Internet d ep ends on a number of social condition s. Especially the p otential of online groups to make new contacts and to socialize may influence its social impact. P ast discussions abou t the possibility of community on the Internet revealed tha t the term "online community" is used in different ways by different authors. Some a uthors use t he term in the sen se of a sociological group, whe reas others speak of online communit ies in the sense of a social community with its distinct emotional qualities, su ch as common norms, emotional exchange, a nd stability of the group. The use of online groups seems to b e not a very ra r e ph enome non, although it remains to be seen to what extent national differences exist. Empirical research showed that social online communities indeed exist.
It is an open question wh ether su ch social communities are exceptional cases or d evelop w ith some r egularity. Not seldom online groups do not foster active p a rticipation of its members a nd do n ot reach qualities of a social community. Ther efore the qu estion of w hich conditions facilitate active participation of me mbers a nd the em ergence of qualities of a social online community in an online group is of both t h eoret ical a nd practical inte rest. The last section presented different theories that con t ribute to assess t he social con sequen ces of Internet use. Media theories e mphasize t he advantages or disadvantages of sp ecific communication media. For example, it was hypothesized that asyn chronaus communication m edia with facilities for info rmation st oring would ma ke p ossible a larger number of active cont ributors to a discussion than synch ronous media (Jones/Rafaeli 2000) . Preece (2000) argues tha t communication media w ith specific facilities for the expr ession of em otions facilitate empath etic behavior. Sociologi cal and social psychological theories unde rline structural charact eristics of online groups and h ow t hey influen ce the b ehavior , cognition s, and motivations of group members. Some import ant structural characteristics of online groups are the heterogeneity of t h e quality of offered information, the group size (Thorn/ Connolly 1987), clear group boundaries, identifiability of members (Kollock 1999; , multifunctionality, social embeddedness (Matzat/ De Vos 2000) , and the difference between off-topic and on-topic chat groups (Sassenberg 2002 ). The theories argue that different mechanisms motivate participation of group members in online activities. Examp les of such mechanisms are the inducement of anticipated r eciprocit y, t he gain of reputation, the consideration of the needs of other members or of t he comm on interests of the group, and social identifica tion with the group.
There remains much empirical researchtobe clone. Much m ore comparative empirical research is needed that takes into account these differen t a pproach es. We need to know more about the prevalence of the different t ypes of motivations to become an active participant in online group activities. How often do m embers of different groups take into account the needs of others? If t he type of motivation depends on certain group characteristics, why is that t he case? Is t here a selection effect in the sense that self-help groups tend t o attract individuals with a higher degree of altruism than other online groups? Or is there a causal relationship between t he group characteristic and the activated m otivation, as som e theories claim? Empirical r esearch is n eed ed that compares different groups an the basis of the group properfies that a re exp ec ted to infl.uen ce behavior and ther eby infl.uence the outcomes of the grou p for the m ember s.
Consider ed togethe r, theoretical research on the social sh aping of t he Inte rnet a nd the governance of online groups may, a t a first glance, a ppear impressive. It seems that the presented theories could b e building block s of a gen eral t heor y of community development on t h e Interne t. However, I see at least t hree problems that have to b e overcome in theory development: the neglect of b eh avioral t heory, the neglect of the structure of interdependen cy, and t h e difference b etween cognition and b eh avior.
First , m edia theories tend to emphasize the charact eristics of the technology a t the cost of neglecting behavioral tendencies of the members (see section 4. 1 ). Even if a specific communica tion medium provides additional opportunities for me mbers, the theories r emain silent w ith r egard to the q uestion how the different opportunities ch ange behavior. Opportunities a re used only wh en t hey are h elpful for reaching certain goals tha t the m ember s may h ave. For examp le, some media w it h a 'better ' usability may reduce the costs (time, effort) of p roviding h elp to oth ers. If members still t hink tha t the provision of help is useless for themselves then they w ill n ot use the opportunity. M ore opp ortunities for the display of e motions may harm the m ember who shows emotions and makes himself v ulner a ble. Under su ch conditions, media differences alone do not matter. I propose that t h eories a b out the impact of media should t ake into account m ore the behavioral consequences of t h e m edia tha t oft en will mediate the p otential effect s of media induced cha n ges.
Second, some theories neglect the structure of interdependen cy between m emb er s (see section 4.1 and 4.3) . Tha t is, they neglect to what extent the comm on inte rests of t he group or the confl.icting interests of individuals prevail. Studies of knowledge sharing in online groups often take into account the structur e of interdependency whereas studies of the provision of social support often do n ot, although free rider problems exist in both groups (see section 4. 1 ) . Medical and self help groups have a large policy relevance (Burrows/Nettleton/Pleace 2000; Wright 2000; Muncer et al. 2000a; Swickert et al. 2002; Dunharn et al. 1998; Muncer et al. 2000b ). It would be fruitful for further resea r ch on online social support to take into account the structure of interdependen cy more carefully to find out how problems of cooperation can be solved.
Third, theory should distinguish more clearly between p otential effects of group characteristics on the members' cognitions and on t he members' b ehavior. Some argue that group features affect cognitive processes (see section 4.3) and that they thereby have their strongest impact on the outcomes of the group. Others focus on behavioral processes (see section 4.2.1 and section 4.2 .2) and argue that group features have their strongest impact on t h e outcomes of the group v ia behavioral processes. At the moment, it is u nclear who is right. Both approaches could benefit from incorporating parts of each other: the link between cognition and behavior deserves more attention in social psych ological approaches, whereas sociological approaches often neglect cognitive or emotional asp ects.
Finally, it would b e useful to have geneml theories of online interaction and n ot sepa r a ted approaches for online groups w ith a commercial or organ izational relevance on the one ha nd and different approaches for online grou ps with a social releva nce on the other hand. Ruma ns do not ch a n ge their nature w he n they sometimes use knowledge sh aring gr oups for professional reasons and sometimes use online hobby groups for socializing or online supp or t grou ps for finding fellow-sufferers. M oreover, even online groups t hat were not founded w it h the inte ntion to build up a social online community might pr ofit from reaching some qualities of a social community, since it h elps to reduce problems of coop er ation. One might obj ect to this v iew that members of social support online groups would b e have much more altruistically than m embers of k nowled ge sharing online groups a nd that therefore the problems tha t these groups face are different. I a m not convinced of the usefulness of this Countera rgument because of two r easons . First , ther e is evidence tha t suggests tha t problem s of cooperation exist in both kinds of groups (see section 4.1 ). Second, even if members of d iffere nt grou ps would b ehave somewh at differently in differe nt kinds of online gr oups, research h as t o sh ow why this is the case. If it is a selection effect, t h en we have to find out h ow social online communities can b e protected against the intrusion of less cooper a tive individuals. If it is not a selection effect, t h en we n eed to find out w ha t character istics of an online group induce m embers to take into account mor e the n eeds of others.
Indiv iduals, organizations, the economy, a nd society in general may profit from t h e p otential of t he Internet. A solid, integrated t heoretical foundation of research on the social shaping of the Internet a nd the governance of on line groups is a crucial ingredient for the realization of this p ot ential.
